This study examines the philosophical foundations that justify and delimit governmental responsibility for declared governmental programs. It aims to bridge normative political philosophy and legal practice by investigating how political promises and programmatic commitments are transformed into moral and legal claims subject to accountability. The first section analyzes the constitutive relation between authority and public obligation, reviewing legitimacy theories and social-contract reasoning as grounds for treating governmental programs as commitments that citizens may legitimately expect to be honored as a condition of democratic trust. The second section situates accountability within theories of justice, showing how distributive and procedural justice supply evaluative criteria and moral impetus for rendering programmatic aims assessable and enforceable. The third section considers governmental responsibility in light of the principle of legality and the rule of law, outlining institutional pathways legislative specification, administrative oversight, judicial review, and parliamentary mechanisms through which political commitments can acquire legal bite or political sanction. Methodologically, the paper combines conceptual analysis with comparative legal inquiry to map how different constitutional frameworks mediate the tension between political discretion and legal constraint. Findings indicate that the legitimacy of holding governments responsible for their programs rests upon a dual convergence: the normative authority conferred by representative institutions and the ethical-legal demand to fulfill public obligations. The study concludes by proposing a calibrated accountability framework statutory clarity regarding programmatic obligations, empowered oversight bodies, and remedial procedures that strengthens accountability while preserving policy continuity and democratic governance.